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NOTES
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-DEFENDANT'S DUE PROCESS
RIGHT TO A PSYCHIATRIC EXPERT-Ake v. Oklahoma.*
INTRODUCTION
The United States Supreme Court recently addressed the ap-
plication of the fourteenth amendment's due process clause to situ-
ations where indigent defendants are in need of state-provided
psychiatric assistance in the preparation and presentation of an in-
sanity defense. Much debate has focused on whether indigent de-
fendants are entitled to experts and investigators at state expense
as a matter of constitutional right,' and the North Carolina Su-
preme Court has indicated that providing such experts is not re-
quired by constitutional mandate.2 Prior to Ake v. Oklahoma,3 the
United States Supreme Court had spoken only once on the issue of
whether an indigent criminal defendant has the right to state-paid
supporting services beyond appointed counsel. In United States ex
rel. Smith v. Baldi,4 the Court stated that they could not "say that
the State has that duty [to provide pre-trial assistance] by consti-
tutional mandate." 5
However, case law development subsequent to Baldi has indi-
cated a trend of expanding the rights of indigent defendants.6 Britt
v. North Carolina has followed that trend by requiring states to
* This note received the I. Beverly Lake Award for Excellence in Constitu-
tional Law.
1. See generally, Comment, The Indigent Criminal Defendant and Defense
Services: A Search for Constitutional Standards, 24 HASTINGS L.J. 647 (1973).
2. State v. Tatum, 291 N.C. 73, 80-84, 229 S.E.2d 562, 566-69 (1976).
3. 105 S. Ct. 1087 (1985).
4. 344 U.S. 561 (1953).
5. Id. at 568.
6. See, e.g., Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189 (1971) (indigent convicted
on non-felony charges has right to free trial transcript on appeal); Douglas v. Cali-
fornia, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (system where counsel was appointed for sole appeal
of right only if appellate court first examined record and determined that counsel
would be helpful was found unconstitutional); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335
(1963) (indigent defendant has right to counsel).
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provide indigent defendants with the basic tools of an "adequate
defense or appeal."7 In Ake, the Supreme Court again addressed
the issue and created a limited right to psychiatric assistance con-
ditioned upon a petitioner making a preliminary showing that his
sanity at the time of the offense is likely to be a significant factor
at trial."
This note analyzes the public policy implications of the Ake
decision while considering the resulting impact on North Carolina.
The note also evaluates the soundness of the decision with respect
to the requirement of a preliminary showing. Finally, recommenda-
tions for implementing the Ake rule are discussed while examining
whether "access to a competent psychiatrist" is in fact a standard
of constitutional disadvantage for the indigent criminal defendant.
THE CASE
Late in 1979, Glen Burton Ake was arrested and charged with
murdering a couple and wounding two children. His bizarre behav-
ior at the time of arraignment prompted the trial judge to sua
sponte order him to be examined by a psychiatrist. The examining
psychiatrist diagnosed Ake as a probable paranoid schizophrenic
and recommended prolonged psychiatric evaluation to determine
whether he was competent to stand trial. Ake was committed to a
state mental hospital and ultimately the court was informed that
he had become competent. The state resumed proceedings, not-
withstanding the fact that Ake was receiving 200 milligrams of
Thorazine, an antipsychotic drug, three times daily. At the pre-
trial conference, defense counsel informed the court that Ake
would raise an insanity defense. Since Ake could not afford to pay
a psychiatrist, the defense attorney asked the court to either ar-
range to have one appointed or to provide funds for the defense to
arrange it. The trial judge rejected counsel's argument that Ake
had a constitutional right to the expert assistance and denied the
motion based on the rationale of Baldi
Ake was tried for two counts of murder in the first degree, a
crime punishable by death in Oklahoma, and for two counts of
7. 404 U.S. 226, 227 (1971).
8. 105 S. Ct. at 1094-97. The Court utilized a three part test to determine
whether the "basic tools of an adequate defense" had been provided to petitioner
Ake. See infra notes 76-91 and accompanying text.
9. Id. at 1090-91.
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shooting with intent to kill.10 Although each of the psychiatrists
who had examined Ake at the state hospital testified, none had
examined him as to his insanity at the time of the offense." Conse-
quently, there was no testimony for either the prosecution or de-
fense on this point.' 2 The jurors were instructed as to the pre-
sumption of sanity and, lacking evidence to the contrary, rejected
the insanity defense and returned a verdict of guilty on all
counts." Despite Ake's argument that, as an indigent defendant,
he should have been provided a court-appointed psychiatrist, the
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed, observing that "the
State does not have the responsibility of providing such services to
indigents charged with capital crimes."' 4
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and, with Justice Mar-
shall delivering the opinion, reversed. Marshall rejected the rea-
soning of Baldi and held that when a defendant demonstrates to
the trial judge that his sanity at the time of the offense is likely to
be a significant factor at trial, the state must, at a minimum, as-
sure the defendant access to a competent psychiatrist." The psy-
chiatrist shall conduct an appropriate examination and assist in
the evaluation, preparation, and presentation of the defense. 6
BACKGROUND
A. Constitutional Basis for the Right to an Expert Psychiatrist
The United States Supreme Court first addressed the question
of whether an indigent criminal defendant in a state court is enti-
tled to the appointment of an expert at state expense to assist in
the preparation and presentation of his defense when it considered
United States ex rel. Smith v. Baldi in 1953." In Baldi, the indi-
gent defendant contended that the state had a duty to provide
technical pre-trial assistance to help establish his defense of in-
sanity. 8 The Court disagreed, holding that the state had no such
10. Id. at. 1091.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 1092.
15. Id. at 1097.
16. Id.
17. See generally, United States ex rel. Smith v. Baldi, 344 U.S. 561 (1953).
18. Id. at 565.
19861
3
Auman: Criminal Procedure - Defendant's Due Process Right to a Psychiatr
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1986
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW
constitutional responsibility. 9 No explanations were given for this
finding, though the Baldi Court referred to McGarty v. O'Brien20
in reaching its conclusion. The McGarty opinion had previously
noted that although indigent defendants operate at a disadvantage,
this impairment is not imposed by the state.21 Rather, the predica-
ment is merely a product of the financial situation in which an in-
digent finds himself 2 2 Fortunately for indigent defendants in need
of psychiatric assistance, the precedential value of Baldi is highly
questionable. This challenge can be based on the fact that three
psychiatrists did testify at trial, including one at the court's re-
quest,23 in addition to the fact that defense counsel may have im-
properly requested the expert assistance before trial.24
In the late fifties and early sixties, the Supreme Court began
to actively promote and expand the rights of indigent defendants,
indicating a retreat from the rationale of Baldi. In Gideon v.
Wainwright,2 5 the Court overturned its decision in Betts v. Brady26
and held that the fourteenth amendment fully incorporated the
sixth amendment right to counsel. Since the government hires at-
torneys to prosecute and wealthy defendants hire lawyers to re-
present them, the Court concluded that lawyers for the indigent
were essential in order to ensure fair trials.27
Griffin v. Illinois28 and Douglas v. California29 also served to
expand the rights of indigents, continuing the trend of ensuring
poor defendants protections similar to those available to the
wealthy. The Griffin Court found that although a state is not con-
stitutionally required to provide appellate courts or a right to ap-
pellate review,30 a state which does grant appellate review cannot
do so in a way that discriminates against poor defendants. 3' Justice
Black's plurality opinion held that under the due process and
equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment, a state may
19. Id. at 568.
20. 188 F.2d 151 (1st Cir. 1951).
21. Id. at 155.
22. Id.
23. 344 U.S. at 568.
24. Id. The propriety of counsel's request was in dispute.
25. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
26. 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
27. 372 U.S. at 344.
28. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
29. 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
30. 351 U.S. at 18.
31. Id.
[Vol. 8:323
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not prevent an indigent defendant from appealing a conviction
simply because he is too poor to pay for a trial transcript.2 The
Court stressed that "there can be no equal justice where the kind
of trial a man gets depends on the amount of money he has."3" The
Douglas Court held unconstitutional a system in which counsel
was appointed in the sole appeal of right only if the appellate court
first examined the record and determined that counsel would be
helpful to the appellant or to the court.3 4 Writing for the majority,
Justice Douglas emphasized the inequality in treatment between
those Who had their own counsel and those who were too poor to
retain their own.35
Britt v. North Carolina,6 a case relied on by the Ake major-
ity,37 interpreted Griffin and Douglas as establishing the principle
that a state must provide indigent prisoners with the "basic tools
of an adequate defense or appeal." 38 In Britt, the Court specifically
rejected an argument that a petitioner who requests a free tran-
script must specify how the transcript would be useful to him. 9
However, since the petitioner conceded that he had an alternative
available that appeared substantially equivalent to a transcript,
the Court found no error and rejected his claim.40
B. Statutory Aids to Indigent Defendants
Congress foreclosed the issue of an indigent's constitutional
right to psychiatric assistance in the federal courts with the pas-
sage of the Criminal Justice Act of 1964.41 The statute was
prompted by the desire to "achieve more meaningful and effective
representation for defendants in federal criminal cases. '42 Under
this legislation, district courts must provide defense counsel with
32. Id. at 19.
33. Id.
34. 372 U.S. at 355.
35. Id. at 357-58.
36. 404 U.S. 226 (1971).
37. See 105 S. Ct. at 1094.
38. 404 U.S. at 227.
39. Id. at 228.
40. Id. at 230. The petitioner had requested a transcript from his prior mis-
trial, but the Court found that he could have called the court reporter at the
mistrial to read any inconsistent testimony to the jury at the second trial. Id. at
229.
41. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (1976).
42. H.R. Rep. No. 1546, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 3982, 3984.
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funds for investigative or expert services if the defendant proves
that he is indigent.4 3 Defendants may furthermore obtain the psy-
chiatrist of their choice provided they show need for independent
psychiatric assistance."
The Criminal Justice Act, however, furnishes no relief to indi-
gent defendants in state courts. Several states have provided vari-
ous degrees of expert assistance through legislative efforts designed
to reflect the concerns of the Criminal Justice Act.45 Minnesota, for
example, adopted a rather liberal statute which closely resembles
the original version of the 1964 Act. 46 The Minnesota statute au-
thorizes "investigative, expert or other services necessary to an ad-
equate defense."'' 7 North Carolina has similar provisions found in
§§ 7A-450(b) and 7A-454 of the General Statutes, but the statutes
are comparatively less detailed and somewhat broader than that of
Minnesota. Under North Carolina law, the state is responsible for
paying an indigent defendant's "necessary expenses" in addition to
fees of appointed counsel.' 8 Authorization to pay lies within the
discretion of the trial judge."9
C. Due Process Developments
In 1932, the United States Supreme Court first recognized the
importance of effective assistance of counsel in the decision of
Powell v. Alabama.50 The Powell majority held that due process
was violated when counsel was appointed only minutes before trial
in a capital case,51 and determined that factual investigation was
required for effective representation. 52 A number of cases which
followed Powell developed a line of authority that due process re-
quired effective assistance of counsel and that supporting defense
services are sometimes implicit in the notion of effective counsel.5 3
43. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(e) (1976).
44. See, e.g., United States v. Chavis, 476 F.2d 1137 (D.C. Cir.), reh'g
granted, 486 F.2d 1290 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
45. See Annot., 34 A.L.R.3D 1256, 1270-72 (1970).
46. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 611.21 (West Supp. 1976).
47. Id.
48. See generally, N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 7A-450 to -459 (1981).
49. Id. at § 7A-454 (1981).
50. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
51. Id. at 71.
52. Id. at 57-59.
53. See, e.g., Mason v. Arizona, 504 F.2d 1345 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
420 U.S. 936 (1975); Hintz v. Beto, 379 F.2d 937 (5th Cir. 1967); Greer v. Beto,
328 [Vol. 8:323
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For example, in Hintz v. Beto,54 the Fifth Circuit held that the
fourteenth amendment required appointment of experts far
enough in advance of a state court trial to allow a reasonable time
for investigative examinations and the preparation of defenses that
the results of such examinations may support.55
A more recent example of due process application to the right
of expert assistance is the case of Mason v. Arizona.56 Mason's at-
torney had made a pre-trial motion for a court-appointed investi-
gator which was denied.57 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held
that the due process clause required that a defendant be provided
with investigative assistance when necessary to the preparation of
an effective defense.58 This right, however, was not absolute and
depended on the facts of each case.5 9
Although both the Hintz and Mason decisions could be
counted as victories for indigent defendants, no absolute constitu-
tional right to expert assistance had been forthcoming. Accord-
ingly, due process issues remained far from being settled. Watson
v. Patterson"0 indicated the incongruity among the circuits. In
Watson, a defendant who had been convicted of murder alleged in
a habeas corpus petition that he was denied due process when the
trial court refused to appoint an expert psychiatrist." The Tenth
Circuit dismissed the petition, stating only that fundamental fair-
ness was the test of due process and that nothing in this case
raised a federal constitutional issue.62
D. Compulsory Attendance Approach
In addition to due process arguments for providing expert ser-
379 F.2d 923 (5th Cir. 1967); Bush v. McCollum, 344 F.2d 672 (5th Cir. 1965);
United States v. Germany, 32 F.R.D. 421 (M.D. Ala. 1963).
54. 379 F.2d 937 (5th Cir. 1967).
55. Id. at 941.
56. 504 F.2d 1345 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 936 (1975). For other
examples of cases requiring supporting assistance, see, e.g., Greer v. Beto, 379
F.2d 923 (5th Cir. 1967); Bush v. McCollum, 344 F.2d 672 (5th Cir. 1965).
57. 504 F.2d at 1348.
58. Id. at 1351.
59. Id. at 1352. Here, the court found that Mason had not been substantially
prejudiced and affirmed the denial. Mason's attorney had not indicated why an
investigation by himself was impractical, nor had he advised the court what lines
of inquiry an investigator would pursue. Id. at 1353.
60. 358 F.2d 297 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 876 (1966).
61. Id. at 297.
62. Id. at 298.
1986] 329
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vices, at least one state court has afforded the indigent a right to
psychiatric assistance based on the sixth amendment right to com-
pulsory attendance of witnesses. s The Supreme Court of Illinois in
People v. Watson64 held that the state must provide an indigent
defendant with needed expert witnesses on those issues going "to
the very heart of the defense. ' ' 65 Otherwise, the right of indigent
defendants to present expert witnesses on their behalf would mean
little because indigents cannot afford to pay the fees the experts
demand.6 The Illinois courts have since modified their ruling by
virtue of the People v. Nichols decision, which required the de-
fendant to demonstrate that expert testimony is necessary to prove
a crucial fact before he is entitled to an expert at state expense.17
This approach, however, is subject to critical debate. The sixth
amendment does not indicate that the state has any obligation be-
yond giving defendants the power to force needed witnesses to tes-
tify. Only in Illinois has case law extended a state's obligation
under the sixth amendment to include payment of the indigent de-
fendant's expert witness fees.6 Moreover, the United States Su-
preme Court has held that the federal government has no constitu-
tional duty to pay the expenses of lay witnesses.6 9 In Boling v.
Sharpe,7° the Court determined that a state's duty to pay the high
fees of expert witnesses should be no greater than the federal gov-
ernment's duty to pay expenses for lay witness testimony. 71
ANALYSIS
In holding that an indigent defendant is entitled to access to a
psychiatrist when he has made a preliminary showing that his san-
ity at the time of the offense is likely to be a significant factor at
trial,72 the majority in Ake extended the long-recognized due pro-
cess principle that requires proper functioning of the adversary
63. People v. Watson, 36 Ill. 2d 228, 221 N.E.2d 645 (1966).
64. Id.
65. Id. at 234, 221 N.E.2d at 649.
66. Id. at 233, 221 N.E.2d at 648.
67. 70 Ill. App. 3d 748, 388 N.E.2d 984 (5th Cir. 1979).
68. See generally, Comment, An Indigent Criminal Defendant's Constitu-
tional Right To A Psychiatric Expert, 1984 U. ILL. L. REv. 481.
69. Goldsby v. United States, 160 U.S. 70 (1895).
70. 347 U.S. 497 (1958).
71. Id. at 500.
72. 105 S. Ct. at 1097.
330 [Vol. 8:323
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process.73 Justice Marshall noted that fundamental fairness today
required a different result than that reached in United States ex
rel. Smith v. Baldi, where states had been totally absolved of any
obligation to provide expert, assistance to indigent defendants.7"
The Court reasoned that without the help of a psychiatrist to con-
duct an examination on issues relevant to the insanity defense, to
determine whether that defense is viable, to present testimony,
and to prepare the cross-examination of the state's psychiatric wit-
nesses, risk of an inaccurate resolution of sanity issues is extremely
high.75 Accordingly, the Ake majority consolidated prior dicta and
reasonings and formulated a limited constitutional right to psychi-
atric assistance. Justice Marshall, relying on the rationale of Britt
v. North Carolina,76 enumerated a three-step process designed to
identify the basic tools of an adequate defense.77
The first step in the process is to determine the private inter-
est that will be affected by the action of the state.78 This test
should be relatively easy to meet in any criminal pricde--ding, the
nature of which places an individual's life or liberty at risk. Ac-
cordingly, the Ake Court found this interest to be "obvious" and
almost "uniquely compelling. '79 The many constitutional safe-
guards fashioned by the Supreme Court to protect against errone-
ous deprivation of individual rights attest to the importance of this
interest. 0
Secondly, the governmental interest of the state should be
considered. This interest, while slightly more complex than the in-
dividual private interest, is rather difficult to identify. In Ake, the
State of Oklahoma asserted that to provide the petitioner with
psychiatric assistance would result in a staggering financial burden
on the state." The Supreme Court was unpersuaded, especially
since the obligation of the state could have been satisfied by pro-
73. Id. at 1094. Justice Marshall noted that "meaningful access to justice"
has been the consistent theme throughout prior criminal due process decisions.
Id.
74. Id. at 1097-98. See also supra notes 17-24 and accompanying text.
75. Id. at 1096.
76. See supra notes 36-40 and accompanying text.
77. 105 S. Ct. at 1094.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. See supra notes 25-40 and accompanying text.
81. 105 S. Ct. at 1094.
19861
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viding only one psychiatrist.8 2 Moreover, the Court found it diffi-
cult to identify any interest of a state, other than economic, that
could weigh against recognition of the limited constitutional right
to expert assistance.8 3 By not discussing hypothetical situations
and the various governmental interests that may be asserted
therein, the Court left the door open for a state to potentially over-
come a defendant's private interest in this second part of the anal-
ysis. However, the possibility remains remote in light of Justice
Marshall's strong dicta which stressed that any state interest
would be tempered by the governmental interest of fair and accu-
rate adjudication of criminal cases."' As the third part of the Ake
process indicates, deprivation of expert assistance may result in in-
accurate dispositions.
The third step is an inquiry into the probable value of the
procedural safeguards that are sought, and the risk of erroneous
deprivation of the affected interest if those safeguards are not pro-
vided.85 This part of the three-step process is highly significant in
petitioner Ake's situation, for principles of fundamental fairness
recognize that an insane person is not capable of committing a
crime.86 Insanity is a complete defense,87 not a mere mitigating cir-
cumstance, and the resulting lack of criminal intent deems one not
responsible for his actions. When an indigent defendant who may
very likely have been insane at the time of his offense is adjudi-
cated guilty of a criminal act merely because he was too poor to
hire a psychiatrist, there rises the specter of a grave injustice.
The Supreme Court emphasized the necessity of psychiatric
assistance in Ake, maintaining that such assistance may be "crucial
to the defendant's ability to marshall his defense."88s While a lay
witness may be able to describe symptoms they believe might be
relevant to the defendant's mental state, a psychiatrist can identify
the "elusive and often deceptive" symptoms of insanity.89 The
probable value of a psychiatrist to conduct professional examina-
tions on issues relevant to the defense and to help determine
82. Id.
83. Id. at 1094-95.
84. Id. at 1095.
85. Id.
86. People v. Wells, 202 P.2d 53 (Cal. 1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 836
(1949).
87. State v. Cooper, 170 N.C. 719, 87 S.E. 50 (1915).
88. 105 S. Ct. at 1095.
89. Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9, 12 (1950).
332 [Vol. 8:323
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whether an insanity defense is viable is obvious. A psychiatrist can
also present testimony and assist in preparing cross-examination of
a state's psychiatric witness. Defense counsel may be able to con-
duct psychological investigations into a defendant's medical back-
ground, but attorneys cannot make meaningful evaluations or chal-
lenge the findings of the prosecution's expert witness without
access to their own psychiatric expert. In the absence of such assis-
tance, as noted in Ake, risk of inaccurate resolution of sanity issues
can be extremely high.90 With assistance, however, the defendant is
fairly able to present at least enough information to the jury so as
to enable them to make a meaningful and sensible determination."
The Ake majority did not, as pointed out by Justice Rehnquist
in his dissenting opinion,92 elucidate how a defendant is to satisfy
the requirement that he make a preliminary showing that his san-
ity at the time of the offense is likely to be a significant factor at
trial. It is possible that courts who are generally sympathetic to
prosecutors could construe this requirement narrowly, due to the
overwhelming showing of possible insanity that was made by peti-
tioner Ake. The Ake Court identified five factors that, taken to-
gether, made it clear that the question of Ake's sanity was likely to
be a significant factor in his defense. First, Ake's sole defense was
that of insanity. 3 Second, Ake's behavior at arraignment was so
bizarre as to prompt the trial judge, sua sponte, to have him ex-
amined for competency.94 Third, a state psychiatrist shortly there-
after found Ake to be incompetent to stand trial, and suggested
that he be committed.9 5 Fourth, when Ake was found to be compe-
tent six weeks later, it was only on the condition that he be se-
dated with large doses of Thorazine three times a day. 6 Finally,
the psychiatrists who examined Ake for competency described to
the trial court the severity of Ake's mental illness and suggested
that this illness might have begun many years earlier.9 7 Based on
the public policy concerns articulated by the Court in the third
part of their three-step analysis, 98 one could successfully argue that
90. 105 S. Ct. at 1096.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 1099.
93. Id. at 1098.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. See supra notes 85-91 and accompanying text.
1986]
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any of the five factors alone should suffice to satisfy the prelimi-
nary showing requirement.
A comparison with the showing required for establishing in-
competency to stand trial may shed light on the intentions of the
Ake majority concerning the preliminary showing requirement.
When attempting to establish incompetency to stand trial, a de-
fendant must raise bona fide doubt as to his own competency
before the judge will even order a psychiatric examination. 9
Courts base a finding of incompetency on present mental illness
and a defendant asserting incompetency may appear agitated or
otherwise abnormal to the judge and lay witnesses. In contrast,
courts base a finding of insanity on past mental illness. The de-
fendant may appear normal to lay witnesses and jurors seeing the
defendant in the courtroom. Such defendants therefore have a
greater need for psychiatric assistance in the form of an authority
figure who can explain to the jury that mental disease can manifest
itself in overt behavior which later disappears. Furthermore,
prosecutorial objectives differ when faced with a defendant who as-
serts incompetency to stand trial rather than insanity. In the for-
mer situation, the prosecution will not attack the court-appointed
expert's opinion because a finding of incompetency usually sub-
jects the defendant to institutional confinement until the defend-
ant's condition improves. An insanity acquittal, however, totally
relieves the defendant of criminal responsibility, thereby providing
more incentive for the prosecutor to employ a psychiatric expert to
rebut the defendant's contention of insanity. A defendant there-
fore needs psychiatric testimony to rebut the prosecution's expert.
In keeping with the above considerations, a defendant asserting an
insanity defense has a much greater need for psychiatric assistance
than the defendant pleading incompetency. Hence, the require-
ment of a preliminary showing in Ake should be construed in a
flexible manner to recognize and reflect the public policy concern
of a fair and accurate resolution of issues.
Ake should have immediate impact on North Carolina since
the issue of whether an indigent is constitutionally entitled to psy-
chiatric assistance has never been addressed in our state. The
North Carolina Supreme Court had the opportunity to decide the
issue in State v. Patterson,0 0 but specifically declined to do so.1"1
99. Pedrero v. Wainwright, 590 F.2d 1383 (5th Cir. 1979).
100. 288 N.C. 553, 569-70, 220 S.E.2d 600, 612 (1975), vacated in part, 428
U.S. 904 (1976).
[Vol. 8:323
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In Patterson, two psychiatrists had already been supplied by the
state to adjudicate the defendant's competency to stand trial, and
the court found no violation of due process in the refusal to ap-
point a third.'0 2 The North Carolina Supreme Court has, however,
attempted to construe N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 450(b) and 7A-454.10 3
Section 7A-450(b) provides in part: "Whenever a person. . . is de-
termined to be an indigent person entitled to counsel, it is the re-
sponsibility of the State to provide him with counsel and the other
necessary expenses of representation.' '1 4 Section 7A-454 similarly
contains provisions that can arguably be applied when an indigent
seeks expert services, providing in part: "Supporting services. The
court, in its discretion, may approve a fee for the services of an
expert witness who testifies for an indigent p- sonhnd-.., fees
and expenses accrued under this section shall be paid by the
State."10 5
These statutory provisions were addressed in State v.
Tatum,106 which became the leading case on an indigent's constitu-
tional right to an expert. In Tatum, the supreme court ruled that
authorizing a state-paid investigator was within the trial court's
discretion and should be done only upon a clear showing that spe-
cific evidence is available and necessary."0 7 In 1977, the court, rely-
ing on Tatum, concluded that the standard to be applied is
whether a "reasonable likelihood" exists that the expert will mate-
rially assist the defendant in the preparation of his defense. s08 The
three-step process of Ake should abrogate the "reasonable likeli-
hood" standard, though the trial judge's discretion remains with
respect to the preliminary showing requirement.
Prior to Ake, the North Carolina Supreme Court in State v.
Montgomery merely required a defendant who requested expert
assistance to show that the expert would produce evidence
101. Id. The court viewed the issue as whether the North Carolina Constitu-
tion mandated the appointment of a third psychiatrist of the defendant's choos-
ing, and held that an indigent is not entitled to an expert of his choice. Id. at 570,
220 S.E.2d at 612.
102. Id. at 570, 220 S.E.2d at 612-13.
103. See generally, N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 7A-450 to -459 (1981).
104. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-450(b) (1981).
105. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-454 (1981).
106. 291 N.C. 73, 229 S.E.2d 562 (1976).
107. Id. at 82, 229 S.E.2d at 568 (1976).
108. See State v. Gray, 292 N.C. 270, 278, 233 S.E.2d 905, 911 (1977).
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favorable to his defense.10 9 In contrast, the court in Tatum re-
quired a much stronger showing. Petitioner Tatum was denied a
court-appointed investigator because he had not made a "clear
showing that specific evidence [was] reasonably available and nec-
essary."' 10 According to the court, its conclusion was justified since
Tatum had the benefit of a favorable discovery order and because
his testimony indicated that he was aware of all persons who could
provide information concerning the events in question."' By re-
quiring such a showing in this case, the court in effect asked for
the impossible: to get an investigator the defendant must demon-
strate that essential evidence was reasonably available, an unlikely
possibility without the assistance of an investigator. The stringent
standard was also inconsistent with that enunciated in Montgom-
ery.' 1 Based on the public policy concerns and the five-factor ap-
proach adhered to in Ake, 1 3 it is unlikely that the Tatum rationale
could be upheld at the present date.
Although Ake dealt specifically with a situation of insanity,
the ratio decidendi can be legitimately applied to fact situations
where other forms of expert assistance are sought by indigent de-
fendants. As noted in the opinion, "justice cannot be equal where,
,simply as a result of his poverty, a defendant is denied the oppor-
tunity to participate meaningfully in a judicial proceeding in which
his liberty is at stake."'14 Meaningful participation should not be
limited to circumstances that call for the defense of insanity. The
basic tools of an adequate defense are necessary in all criminal tri-
als, and thereby should be provided to indigents upon their meet-
ing the three-part test of Ake.115 Justice Marshall's use of the term
"procedural safeguard" rather than "psychiatric expert" lends fur-
ther support to the contention that application should not be re-
stricted to insanity situations." 6
Access to an impartial expert, whether a psychiatrist or some
other professional, may not be enough to ensure accurate resolu-
109. 291 N.C. 91, 97-98, 229 S.E.2d 572, 577 (1976).
110. 291 N.C. 73, 82, 229 S.E.2d 562, 568 (1976).
111. Id. at 82-83, 229 S.E.2d at 568.
112. Supra note 90 and accompanying text.
113. See supra notes 88-98 and accompanying text.
114. 105 S. Ct. at 1093.
115. See supra notes 76-91 and accompanying text.
116. 105 S. Ct. at 1094. Justice Marshall did use the term "psychiatric assis-
tance" when discussing petitioner Ake's factual application to the test. Id. at
1099.
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tion of sanity issues. The Ake Court, instead of mandating that an
indigent defendant has a constitutional right to a state-paid expert
of his choice, merely stated that the indigent should have "access
to a competent psychiatrist."1 7 Decisions with respect to the im-
plementations of this right were left to the states.1 8 In his dissent-
ing opinion in Ake, Justice Rehnquist pointed out that a psychia-
trist is not an advocate for the defense, as is an attorney, but is
rather one who is available for an independent opinion. 1 9 The Ake
majority should have addressed this assertion, for it is not alto-
gether true. An affluent defendant certainly has the ability to se-
lect a partisan psychiatric expert who will act on his behalf. The
affluent defendant can usually find a psychiatrist willing to testify
that he was insane or incapable of formulating the requisite mens
rea in order to commit the crime for which he was charged.' 20 With
impartial assistance, the indigent defendant completely lacks the
ability to wage a "battle of the experts.'2 In addition, the prose-
cution may call the impartial expert as a state witness if the ex-
pert's report is unfavorable to the defendant.
Notwithstanding the obvious disparity between the indigent
and affluent defendant, states are not likely to give the indigent his
choice of experts. The Constitution does not mandate the elimina-
tion of all legal disparity in the availability of legal advantage.12
An alternative other than providing the indigent with his choice of
experts is the concept of a panel. The state should, considering the
public policy concerns of Ake, choose to modify prior procedures
by disallowing all partisan experts. This would eliminate prejudice
with regard to both the defendant and the prosecution. Ohio and
Arizona, for example, have statutory provisions which allow the
court to appoint a panel of experts to examine the defendant." 3
Both states permit the state and the defendant to name their re-
spective choices to the panel. A procedure such as this would go far
117. Id. at 1097.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 1102.
120. Proctor v. Harris, 413 F.2d 383, 388 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (Bazelon, J.,
concurring).
121. The phrase "battle of the experts" refers to the tendency in insanity
cases for the testimony of opposing psychiatrists to conflict. See McGarty v.
O'Brien, 188 F.2d 151, 155-57 (1st Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 928 (1951).
122. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 357 (1963).
123. See ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4013 (1978); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §
2945.39 (Page 1982).
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towards equalizing the position of indigent defendants and affluent
defendants. North Carolina, which does not recognize the indigent
defendant's right to a psychiatrist of his choice," 4 would especially
benefit from such reform.
CONCLUSION
In Ake, the United States Supreme Court recognized that an
indigent defendant cannot effectively assert an insanity defense
without the assistance of a psychiatric expert. The opportunity for
a defendant to participate meaningfully in criminal proceedings is
lost without such assistance, thereby risking inaccurate resolution
of sanity issues. By holding that an indigent defendant is allowed
access to a psychiatrist when his sanity at the time of the offense is
in question, the Ake majority created a limited constitutional right
that should have immediate impact on the State of North Caro-
lina. State payment for the services of such experts gives meaning
to the concept of an adversary system, especially if the state pro-
cures expert assistance to develop and present its own case. Utiliz-
ing Justice Marshall's three-part test,125 the Ake rationale may fur-
ther be applied to indigent defendants seeking other forms of
expert assistance.
The parameters of an indigent defendant's rights under Ake
remain somewhat difficult to discern. The right to a psychiatrist is
not absolute and requires the defendant to first make a prelimi-
nary showing that his sanity will be a significant factor at trial.
The Ake Court did not specify how this requirement is to be satis-
fied, thereby creating the possibility of narrow interpretation and
confusion among various jurisdictions. Moreover, the Supreme
Court did not explain how the limited constitutional right was to
be implemented. Consequently, states are vested with the author-
ity to implement the decision as they see fit. It is important that
states ensure substantial equality between indigent and non-indi-
gent defendants by implementing a system which reflects the fun-
damental fairness concerns of Ake. An accurate disposition of san-
ity issues should be the ultimate goal in each jurisdiction.
William D. Auman
124. State v. Patterson, 288 N.C. 553, 200 S.E.2d 600 (1975) (defendant not
denied due process by failure of court to provide him with his choice of psychia-
trists), vacated in part, 428 U.S. 904 (1976).
125. See supra notes 76-91 and accompanying text.
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